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Abstract 
We examine whether substantial shareholders in target firms possess information about 
imminent takeover activity and if they do, whether they trade opportunistically on the 
information. The results show increased purchases by substantial shareholders close to a 
takeover announcement where these trades predict the likelihood of takeovers. However, 
they do not predict bid premiums nor other deal characteristics. Comparing type of 
substantial shareholder, institutional trades are better indicators of takeover likelihood 
compared to managerial trades. These findings imply that some substantial shareholders 
have an informational advantage about takeover activity and they use it for their own 
benefit. 
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1.  Introduction 
We study substantial shareholder trading activity in target firms in the lead up to takeover 
bids to determine whether these shareholders possess bid information and whether they 
are able to profit from access to this information. Like others, we speculate that substantial 
shareholders have informational advantage over other shareholders. According to Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), they may be semi-informed traders, having access to private information 
via privileged meetings with management or because of their increased levels of monitoring 
and processing ability. Although untested, the assumption that these shareholders have an 
information advantage is implicit in legislation, requiring shareholders holding five percent 
or more of a firm’s outstanding shares to disclose their trading to the firm and the market 
(Corporations Act (Cth) 2001). Takeover bids typically incorporate a substantial premium for 
control (Laamanen 2007) and if substantial shareholders have informational advantage, they 
may have foreknowledge of upcoming bids and trade accordingly to maximise return. 
 
In a related study, Agrawal and Nasser (2012) find that while insiders in the U.S. tend to 
decrease their purchases prior to a bid, they decrease their sales to a greater magnitude. 
This ‘passive trading’ results in a positive level of net purchases which profits the insiders. If 
substantial shareholders trade prior to a bid, the next step is to determine whether these 
trades are predictive of the upcoming bid. The literature on takeover likelihood has focused 
primarily on firm specific characteristics (see for example, Palepu 1986; Powell 1997; 
Rodrigues & Stevenson 2013). Changes in holdings due to private information can 
themselves contain information (Chakravarty 2001) since Keown and Pinkerton (1981) find 
that information leakages occur prior to merger announcements through trading. If a 
substantial shareholder has access to information about a future bid and details of the bid in 
particular the bid premium, their trades may also signal this information. However, Aspris et 
al. (2014) assert that substantial shareholder trading is not predictive of a takeover bid 
where trading is measured by its presence. We challenge this using a more comprehensive 
measure of trading and by categorising the substantial shareholder group into institutional, 
managerial, financial and other to better understand the trading incentive. 
 
Our results show that substantial shareholders possess foreknowledge of future takeover 
activity, as indicated by increases in their purchases prior to the bid announcement. 
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Furthermore, substantial shareholder trading behaviour significantly improves the rate of 
predictive success. However, such trading behaviour is uninformative about the bid 
premium, or other deal characteristics such as the payment method or terms of the deal. 
These results suggest that while substantial shareholders are better informed about the 
probability of imminent takeover bids, they do not appear to be privy to detailed aspects of 
bids such as the premium, payment method or deal terms.  
 
We find no evidence that managerial shareholders change their trading behaviour more 
than other substantial shareholders prior to a bid. While they exhibit little evidence of active 
or passive trading, in contrast, financial institution and other corporation shareholders trade 
to actively increase their holdings in the pre-bid period. Overall, these results indicate that 
substantial shareholders are aware of future takeover activity. While substantial 
shareholders may hold an informational advantage, they may not trade on it. Managerial 
substantial shareholders, those likely to have greatest access to private information avoid 
acting on such information, most likely due to firm monitoring and scrutiny, together with 
additional disclosure requirements.  
 
This study is structured as follows. A review of the relevant literature concerning the 
proposed informational advantage possessed by substantial shareholders, takeover 
likelihood, acquisition premiums and the role of substantial shareholders in takeover 
situations is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, hypotheses are developed and Section 4 
details the data and sample used. A description of the method used is provided in Section 5 
while the results are given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes with a summary, a discussion of 
the limitations and suggestions for future research.  
 
2.  Review of literature and hypotheses 
Several studies predict and find substantial shareholder trading is akin to trading by insiders. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe that substantial shareholders may hold an informational 
advantage through access to private information from involvement in firm governance or 
privileged meetings with management. An informational advantage could also originate 
from these shareholders investing more resources in monitoring because their substantial 
holdings gives them an incentive to do so (Holderness 2003) and affords them economies of 
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scale. This interpretation fits with McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) reporting a negative 
relationship between firm voluntary disclosures and blockholder ownership. High 
blockholder ownership provides more opportunities and incentive for shareholders to 
intervene if management and shareholder interests misalign so the need for information 
disclosure is reduced. On the other hand, the lower level of disclosure could be a way of 
preserving the informational advantage of block holders.  
 
Having an incentive to monitor does not imply direct action to intervene. Edmans (2009) 
posits that substantial shareholders are able to exert governance indirectly without 
intervening in a firm’s operations. Instead they are able to impound information into prices 
by selling their stakes on negative information (Edmans 2009). This action, also known as 
the Wall Street Walk, involves selling out ownership rather than taking a direct role in 
governance (Admati & Pfleiderer 2009). This increases the liquidity available to substantial 
shareholders and their ability to trade.  
 
Several empirical studies support the proposition that large shareholders have an 
informational advantage. Brockman and Yan (2009) find that in the US, the probability of 
informed trading increases with higher levels of block ownership (defined as ownership of 
greater than ten percent of a firm’s outstanding voting shares). Heflin and Shaw (2001) draw 
a similar conclusion of the relationship between block ownership and adverse selection 
spread components. They find that smaller investors are more wary of trading with large, 
presumably more informed investors.  
 
Further evidence of substantial shareholder trades reflecting an informational advantage is 
documented by Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Bushee and Goodman (2007) and Piotroski 
and Roulstone (2005) who find significant association between substantial shareholder 
trades in the US and returns based on return-on-equity, return-on-assets, as well as future 
performance. Gallagher et al. (2013) document similar findings in Australia, where 
institutional substantial shareholders earn significant positive market adjusted returns.  
A closely related study, Aspris et al. (2014), tests the power of substantial shareholder 
trades to predict pre-bid price runups. The pre-bid trading activity they assess includes 
bidder trades that result in substantial shareholder status in the target firm (i.e. holding 5% 
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or more of the outstanding votes) and trading activity by all substantial shareholders that 
cause their holdings to change by one percent or more and thereby trigger a mandatory 
reporting requirement. They record toehold acquisition to indicate if the acquiring firm 
reached a five percent or greater holding of the target firm over a long or short period prior 
to the bid. They find that while only short term toehold acquisitions have a significant 
relationship with the pre-bid price runup, the effect is not robust to the toehold effect 
documented by Bishop (1991). Specifically, Bishop (1991) argues that toehold acquisitions 
revise the market’s anticipation of a takeover bid, while not necessarily signalling a bid.  
 
Aspris et al. (2014) measure substantial shareholder activity in two ways; first, they study an 
acquirer’s toehold acquisition, that is, an acquisition reaching five percent of the firm’s 
outstanding interest (by definition, becoming a substantial shareholder), and use a 
dichotomous variable to indicate this occurrence. Second, they consider trading by other 
substantial shareholders, again measuring this through a dichotomous variable.  
 
H1: Substantial shareholders increase their holdings in target firms prior to a takeover 
bid. 
 
Substantial shareholders have access to superior information because they have both the 
incentive to expend resources in information search and privileged access to managers. 
These advantages, in particular privileged access to information, are likely to be higher for 
substantial shareholders who are also “insiders” (e.g., directors and managers). If so, the 
relationship between pre-bid purchases and insider shareholders is likely to be stronger 
than for other substantial shareholders such as financial institutions or other corporations.  
 
H1a: Insider shareholders increase their holdings in target firms more than other 
substantial shareholders prior to a takeover bid. 
 
The ability to predict takeovers has been the focus of a substantial body of research as 
takeovers have a substantial impact on the various stakeholders within and related to the 
firm, as well as substantial potential return for target shareholders. Asquith (1983) 
documents a significant increase in target firm share prices prior to the announcement of a 
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bid. This indicates that the market is unable to fully predict upcoming takeover bids as the 
higher valuation is not already impounded in prices. This observation leads to the question: 
Why are firms acquired? In asking this question, the literature examines various 
fundamental drivers of takeovers and their ability to predict the likelihood of a takeover 
occurring. While there exist multiple hypotheses explaining the likelihood of a takeover, 
many explanations produce mixed results in empirical analysis, indicating the difficulty of 
predicting takeover outcomes, and the potential gains that holders of private information 
may achieve.  
 
One of the most widely cited reasons for takeovers is inefficient management. Manne 
(1965) argues for a strong positive relationship between the efficiency of a firm’s 
management and share price. This may be acted on by competitors and other management 
teams. Fama (1980) explains that inefficient firms are targeted by such competition as 
investment opportunities in order to improve efficiency and performance. Another reason 
for takeover as documented by Manne (1965) is the ‘recent performance’ hypothesis. The 
‘recent performance’ hypothesis interprets a firm’s lower returns as a signal that the market 
believes recent performance has been poor. With respect to this poor market performance, 
Manne (1965) argues that the stock price is the market’s signal for a change in 
management, and a capital gain linked to the potential value of the firm under competent 
management.  
 
The growth resource mismatch hypothesis can be explained as firms whose resources and 
growth opportunities do not match.2 Jensen (1986) suggests that firms with less growth 
opportunities but more resources are more likely to become takeover targets as 
management may tend to engage in negative NPV projects instead of repaying shareholders 
in dividends or repurchases as this would reduce resources under management control. A 
common proxy used to measure the growth resource mismatch is by comparing sales 
growth to a firm’s liquidity ratio, used by both Palepu (1986) and Powell (2001). While both 
studies find a significant result, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) find that the growth 
                                                          
2 Two possible scenarios can occur: a firm with the capability to invest but a lack of positive net present value 
(NPV) projects to invest in (low growth but high resource), or a firm with a opportunities to invest in positive 
NPV projects but lack the funds to do so (high growth but low resource) (Palepu 1986) 
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resource mismatch hypothesis has little significance in their random sample of US firms 
from 1981 to 1992. A firm’s optimal capital structure is difficult to determine and many 
theories exist. The trade-off between levels of debt and equity is discussed by a number of  
theories, however the underlying requirements are that marginal benefits should equal 
marginal costs of utilising either debt or equity (Myers 1984). Barnes (1999) posits that 
making an acquisition could be used as an alternative route to changing the firm’s capital 
structure, and as such reduces inefficiencies. If a firm has reached its debt capacity, it may 
benefit from taking over another firm with unused debt capacity.  
 
Takeovers have often been observed to occur clustered in groups through time and within 
industries. Gort (1969) suggested that clustered M&A activity could be due to economic 
disturbances within industries over certain periods of time. Palepu (1986) further submits 
that industry disturbances may be short lived, with the emergence of potential targets 
within disturbances quickly consumed by the increased M&A activity. In an Australian study 
by da Silva Rosa et al. (2006), a significant takeover wave effect is also found. Alternative 
views point to the effects of size on acquisition likelihood; Palepu (1986) suggesting that the 
likelihood of a firm being acquired is negatively associated with size. This can be attributed 
to the transaction and integration costs of acquiring large firms; the stronger ability for 
larger firms to defend themselves against acquirers fundamentally limited the ability of an 
acquirer to acquire the target.  
 
While many of the above provide strong explanatory power in modelling the probability of a 
takeover bid occurring, few explanations have improved the rate of correct predictions of 
the model beyond that of chance. Previous takeover predictability models utilise firm 
characteristics to proxy for driving forces of takeovers such as the use of accounting ratios in 
logit models, as in early takeover likelihood models by Stevens (1973) and Belkaoui (1978). 
Palepu (1986) revisits such early models, identifying methodological issues. He proposes 
that they lack strong theoretical explanations for including particular variables, leading to 
‘over-fitting’ the model with statistically significant variables that do not necessarily improve 
predictability performance. The method of random sampling used in previous models to 
match target and non-target firms by industry and size may produce a sample selection bias 
in prediction tests. It would be desirable to use the entire population of firms as sampling 
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and matching firms would produce a higher proportion of targets to control firms. However 
while the matching of target and control firms is not advised in the development of 
prediction tests, Manski and McFadden (1981) as well as Palepu (1986) recommend using 
this technique in determining significance of the various factors used to estimate the model. 
A substantial shareholder’s purchase ratio reveals their aggressiveness in trades (Zhang et 
al. 2005). Higher pre-bid purchases allow a substantial shareholder to profit more from the 
premium offered in a takeover and so it is plausible that higher substantial shareholder 
purchase ratios predict bids. This leads to the second hypothesis:  
 
H2: Substantial shareholders’ purchases are positively related to the likelihood of a 
takeover bid. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that access to information is not necessarily equal across 
different categories of substantial shareholders. Some acquire private information through 
insider status, while others use their resources to more accurately analyse public 
information. Insiders are likely to be better placed than outsiders in accessing pertinent 
information  (Meulbroek 1992). This leads to an extension of hypothesis H2: 
 
H2a: Insider shareholders’ purchases are more closely associated with a subsequent 
takeover bid than the net purchases ratio of other substantial shareholders. 
 
Research on acquisition premiums has found a substantial number of factors that influence 
premiums. If substantial shareholders hold an informational advantage regarding future 
takeover activity, it is expected that they would increase their net purchases to acquire a 
larger premium. The cash consideration hypothesis predicts firms that receive a cash bid are 
offered a higher premium because receiving cash triggers tax liabilities for target 
shareholders and so they require a higher premium relative to share bids to accept the 
offer. Brown and Ryngaert (1991) in the US and (Bugeja & da Silva Rosa 2008) document 
evidence that supports this argument. Manne (1965) discussion of the recent performance 
hypothesis can also be extended to the prediction of the bid premium; the worse the target 
was performing before, the higher the premium may be offered as the acquiring firm is able 
to extract greater benefits from the target firm. This notion ties to the ‘inefficient 
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management’ hypothesis as the replacement of inefficient management may be the 
acquisition’s value driver. Bugeja and Walter (1995) find evidence, albeit weak, for the 
recent performance hypothesis in an Australian sample. As related to takeover likelihood, 
the target firm’s size may have an effect on the premium that is issued by the bid. 
Lambrecht (2004) further shows that the size of the target firm has a significant and positive 
on the bid premium, as larger firms incur greater transaction costs to merge.  
 
Aspris et al. (2014) document that the pre-bid price run up is related to the toehold 
acquisition effect documented by Bishop (1991). The models used to measure substantial 
shareholder trading activity are limited as they only use a dichotomous variable to account 
for the existence of trading by non-acquirer substantial shareholders. Aspris et al. (2014)’s 
measurement of substantial shareholder trading activity may be improved by determining 
the purchase ratio for all substantial shareholders. Given the informed nature of substantial 
shareholder trades, an increase in the purchase ratio of a substantial shareholder indicates a 
larger premium that they try to capture (Asquith 1983). This leads to the third hypothesis:  
 
H3: The level of substantial shareholder purchases is positively associated with 
takeover bid premiums. 
 
Aspris et al. (2014) can be extended by differentiating between different types of substantial 
shareholders. Given that they could hold varying levels of information, we can further test 
whether they explain takeover premiums on varying levels as well (Meulbroek 1992). This 
leads to an extension of hypothesis H3: 
 
H3a: The relationship between purchases by insider shareholders and the takeover bid 
premium is stronger than that of other substantial shareholders. 
 
3.  Data and Method 
Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database was used to collect takeover bids announced 
between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2013. The initial sample of bids on Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) firms with completed takeovers contained 367 takeover bids. 
These bid sets were then filtered by data availability on the Morningstar DatAnalysis 
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Premium database. The number of firms with missing was 116 firms, resulting in a final 
sample of 251 firms. 
 
Data was hand collected from 1,182 substantial shareholder notices for the 251 target and 
251 individually matched control firms. Control firms were matched by industry, and size 
(measured by total assets). These firms were also matched to avoid duplicates; avoiding 
situations where the control firm was within the target set. Substantial shareholder notices 
were collected from the 12 months prior to the takeover bid announcement. We use Form 
604: Change in Substantial Holding where these notices provide information on the change 
in a substantial shareholder’s holdings, which can then be aggregated across longer periods 
into cohesive measures. The information extracted from Form 604 comprised: name of 
substantial holder, date on which change in holdings occurred, number of securities held 
prior to the notice, percentage ownership held by the holder prior to the notice, change in 
the number of securities held, change in percentage ownership held, dollar consideration 
for the change in holdings, the number of securities held after the change, and the 
percentage holding after the change.  
 
Filtering of the substantial shareholder notices collected and recorded resulted in the final 
sample. The first step involved removing notices with unrelated firm information, repeated 
notices or notices involving securities other than ordinary shares. Of the number of forms 
removed, 16 were removed for detailing the changes in stapled securities in particular. The 
other step was the removal of forms which were completed poorly, including forms 
completed with illegible handwriting or missing information which could not be obtained 
through other means. 
 
From the name of the substantial shareholder, the notices were classified into six groups 
according to their investor type; Financial Institution, Management, Corporation, Individual, 
Nominee and Other. The classification is detailed below:  
- Financial Institution: Substantial shareholder is a financial institution. 
- Management: Substantial shareholder is a director of the firm, as shown in the 
DatAnalysis database. 
- Corporation: Substantial shareholder is a non-financial corporation.  
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- Individual: Substantial shareholder is an individual who is not a director of the firm. 
- Nominee: Substantial shareholder is a nominee entity acting on behalf of another 
holder.  
- Other: Substantial shareholder does not meet any of the above criteria. 
 
Data for the control variables are sourced from the Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium, SDC 
Platinum and DataStream.  
 
Research Method 
In analysing trading prior to bid announcements, two periods are defined: the pre-bid and 
the control periods. The former represents six months immediately preceding the bid 
announcement date and the control period is the six months immediately prior to the 
beginning of the pre-bid period. Anilowski Cain et al. (2009) find that takeover discussions 
usually occur three to five months prior to an announcement although there is variation. As 
such we use a pre-bid period of six months prior to the bid announcement date to capture 
all trades in relation to a potential bid, as in Agrawal and Nasser (2012).  
 
We test Hypothesis 1 using a difference-in-difference (DiD) regression to test whether 
substantial shareholder trading in target firms differ from trading in non-target firms  and 
whether trading in the pre-bid period is different from trading in other periods. The model is 
shown in Equation 1 below: 
 
TRADESi,(t-ϕ,t-θ) = α + β1PREBIDi,t +β2 TARGETi,t+β3 LNMCAPi,t+β4 LNPBi,t + β5 LNVOLA i,t + β6 
CVOLAi,t + β7 RETi + β8 PREBIDi,t*TARGETi,t + β9SCHEMEi,t + β10 CASHi,t + β11 STOCKi,t + 
β12DRECOMi,t +εi                                 (1) 
 
where 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑖,(𝑡−𝜙,𝑡−𝜃) represents the various trade measures, where (𝜙, 𝜃) =
(12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠, 6 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠) for control periods and (𝜙, 𝜃) = (6 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠, 0 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠) for pre-
bid periods. These measures are recalculated using the dollar value of the transactions as 
well. 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 indicate whether that observation is during the pre-bid or 
control period, and of a target firm or control firm respectively for the ith firm. The variable 
of interest, 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is used to indicate a target firm in the pre-bid period. 
12 
 
The test aims to determine whether substantial shareholders have significantly different 
trade measures when the 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 term is equal to one. 
𝐿𝑁𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝐵𝑖,𝑡,  𝐿𝑁𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡, CVOLA𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖  are the natural log of the firm’s 
market capitalisation, natural log of the firm’s price-to-book ratio, natural log of the firm’s 
price volatility, change in price volatility and stock return respectively for the ith firm. 
S𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐷𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 indicate a bid which is a scheme of 
arrangement, a cash only bid, a stock only bid and an accepting director’s recommendation 
respectively for the ith firm.  
 
For Hypothesis 2, a logistic regression is used to determine whether substantial shareholder 
trades are predictive of a takeover bid. This method uses a multivariate logistic approach to 
determine factors predicting the occurrence of a bid, as well as calculating the rate of 
correct predictions.  
 
The multivariate logistic model is estimated as follows in Equation 2:  
 
𝑝𝑖 =
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−(𝑃𝑅𝑖𝛽𝑖,0+∑ 𝑋𝑖,𝑗𝛽𝑖,𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1
))
        (2) 
where 𝑝𝑖 represents the probability of the ith firm receiving a takeover bid, 𝑃𝑅𝑖 represents 
the ith firm’s substantial shareholder purchase ratio for the pre-bid period. The purchase 
ratio is a method of aggregating trades to show the aggressiveness of the substantial 
shareholders’ trading activity. Higher purchase ratios indicate more purchases relative to 
sales. This measure is calculated on an aggregate of all substantial shareholder types, as well 
as in individual groups of financial institutions, management and corporations. 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
represents the control variables. The sign of the coefficients 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 indicates the direction of 
change of the odds ratio, i.e. the likelihood of a takeover bid. We also provide the rate of 
correct target prediction to examine our ability to predict the takeovers. 
 
A Tobit regression is used to test Hypothesis 3 as the bid premium is not expected to be 
negative. The model is as follows:  
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𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖 = {
𝑃𝑅𝑖𝛽𝑖,0 + ∑ 𝑋𝑖,𝑗𝛽𝑖,𝑗
𝑗
𝑗=1 , 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖 > 0
0, 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖 ≤ 0
                          (3) 
where 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖  represents the bid premium for the ith target firm; 𝑃𝑅𝑖 represents the ith 
firm’s substantial shareholder purchase ratio for the pre-bid period. This measure is 
calculated on an aggregate group of all substantial shareholder types, as well as in sub-
groups of financial institutions, management and corporations. 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 represents control 
variables. The sign of the coefficients 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 shows the direction of change in the premium.  
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Panel A of Table 2 gives an overview of the 
distribution of all trades, with dollar and volume measures with medians close to zero but 
means that deviate. The substantial variation, as shown by the standard deviations, explain 
the non-normality of the two data sets. As such for calculation, the trades are aggregated by 
period and by firm.  
 
Panel B of Table 2 details the spread of trades in periods which are during the pre-bid period 
versus the control period, as well as firms which are targets versus control firms. In 
comparing the groups, medians are relatively close to zero throughout as expected, 
however the means of trades in pre-bid periods are larger than those of control periods. 
Interestingly, the group with the highest mean is that of the trades in a pre-bid period, in 
control firms, however this seems to be driven by very substantial observations. The data 
shows that the various groups of substantial shareholder trades appear to be quite 
different, and further statistical testing determines whether these differences may be 
explained by the hypotheses.  
 
Panel C displays descriptive statistics detailing the distribution of target firms’ 
characteristics. The range of the size of firms, based on assets and market capitalisation is 
very substantial, however the means are greater than medians, indicating the greater set of 
substantial firms becoming target firms. This is present throughout the characteristics, as 
the skewness is consistently positive.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
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Table 3 presents the regression results used to formally test the difference in trading activity 
in different firms and different time periods prior to the bid. Panel A displays the results for 
the difference-in-difference test in explaining the trades of all substantial shareholders. The 
coefficients of TARGET*PREBID are significant and positive across buys, sells and net 
purchases, showing that all three measures increase when trading in a target firm during the 
pre-bid period.  
 
Even with increases in the volume of sells, these increases are smaller than increases in the 
volume of buys which lead to a significant net purchase increases. These results are 
reflected in Panels B and D, showing that buys, sells and net purchases by both financial 
institutions and corporations increased during the pre-bid period in target firms. The sign of 
the TARGET*PREBID variable coefficient on buys, sells and net purchases for management 
was also positive but not significant.  
 
In analysing aggregate trades in Panel A, LNASSETS shows a higher level of trading in larger 
than smaller firms, which is most heavily reflected in the trades of institutional 
shareholders. Financial institutions also trade on the price-to-book ratio, however the level 
of buys, sells and net purchases decrease with increasing price-to-book levels. Deal 
characteristic variables are only significant in management trades where they explain the 
occurrence of a scheme, cash only or stock only deal causes management to decrease their 
sells.  
 
The results show that substantial shareholders trade considerably more during pre-bid 
periods in target firms when compared to trading in target firms during a control period, 
and trading in control firms during both the pre-bid and control period. This result supports 
Hypothesis 1, as it is shown that on the aggregate level, substantial shareholders increase 
their net purchases during the pre-bid on target firms more than at other times.  
 
The results shown in Table 2 Panel A on the aggregate measure of substantial shareholders 
are derived from the trading present in financial institution and corporation substantial 
shareholders. This implies that both groups may in fact have informational advantage and 
are able to predict an upcoming bid, thus trading accordingly in order to realise benefits 
15 
 
from the bid. Interestingly the method of accruing shares used is to increase their buys 
greater than their sells, which is an active method of trading. The economic significance of 
this result is evident as the level of net purchases increases by 4.1653 million shares when 
the firm is a target and trades are during the pre-bid period.  
 
Management substantial shareholders do not appear to significantly change their trading 
activity during the pre-bid period on target firms. They decrease their buys, however this is 
not shown to differ between the pre-bid and control period. These results are reflective of 
Agrawal and Nasser (2012) who find that that insiders trade passively, increasing their net 
purchases prior to a takeover bid. However as there is no significant increase in net 
purchases of management substantial shareholder in the pre-bid period in target firms, 
Hypothesis 1a is not supported.  
Why are financial institutions and other corporations able to actively increase their holdings 
in a target firm prior to a bid without investigation of informed trading? A contributing 
factor is that the acquirer may have a toehold in the target firm and is increasing their stake 
in the leadup to a bid. This factor would contribute more strongly to the observed net 
purchase increases in corporation substantial shareholders as they are more likely to be 
acquirers than financial institutions.  
 
Given that management substantial shareholders show minimal changes to their trading 
activity, another explanation is that the market tailors its focus of monitoring informed 
trading on insiders and focuses less on other substantial shareholders. As insiders, 
management substantial shareholders require much more rigorous disclosure and market 
pressure in making the decision to trade, thus reducing their ability to make profitable 
trades stealthily. However other substantial shareholders are not required to meet insider 
trading regulation or other forms of disclosure besides submitting substantial shareholder 
notices, and thus are more able to actively trade prior to takeover bids.  
 
The tests conducted do not indicate, if any, the source of information these substantial 
shareholders are trading on. Another explanation is that substantial shareholders hold a 
                                                          
3 Interaction term’s coefficient effect calculated as −4.397 − 2.648 + 11.21 = 4.165 
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comparative advantage in processing signals from target firms. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
argue that a trader must benefit from a transaction made, otherwise there would be no 
reason to trade. In accumulating and increasing a substantial holding, a substantial 
shareholder’s portfolio effectively becomes less diversified, and as such would not take this 
action if not for any possible benefits they may accrue. A substantial shareholder may use 
their comparative advantage, and would have greater incentive to process signals by the 
target firm into information on which trades could be based (Shleifer & Vishny 1997).  
 
Results from the logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 3. The models determine 
the explanatory power of substantial shareholder purchase ratios on the likelihood of a bid.  
The first model tests the strength of the firm specific controls used in previous literature. 
The results show that the inefficient management hypothesis (Manne 1965) and the growth 
resource mismatch factor (Palepu 1986) are slightly significant in predicting the likelihood of 
a bid. The coefficient for the size proxy takes a positive sign, which is not expected as larger 
firms have higher transaction costs of acquisition (Palepu 1986). Other variables are still 
within the 20% significance level, and have unexpected signs. As the samples of both time 
periods contain equal numbers of control and target firms, the chance prediction rate to 
predict a bid is 50%. For the first model the model’s target prediction rate is 49.39%, slightly 
lower than chance, indicating that the variables used introduce a level of noise into the 
model.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The first model to include the substantial shareholder trade purchase ratios uses the 
aggregate measure; the purchase ratio of all substantial shareholders in the pre-bid period 
is a significant predictor of the likelihood of a takeover bid. The sign of the coefficient 
indicates that as the purchase ratio of substantial shareholders increase, the likelihood of 
takeover increases as expected.  
 
The control variables have the same signs as the previous model, with ROE and the sales 
growth to liquidity ratio maintaining significance after the addition of the purchase ratio to 
the model. Other control variables do not show great significance in explaining the 
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likelihood of the bid. The fit of the model also increases from a McFadden’s R-squared of 
0.014 to 0.027 with the addition of the purchase ratio to the model. Overall, including the 
purchase ratio into the takeover likelihood model increases its fit and prediction rate which 
shows that the model has been improved.  
 
When examining the individual groups of substantial shareholders, we find that again the 
corporation and financial institution groups provide strong evidence of increasing the 
likelihood of takeover, while management substantial shareholders have no significant 
effect. Furthermore the target prediction rates and McFadden R-squared values of both 
models including financial institution and corporation purchase ratios improve, which 
adding management purchase ratios does not improve the models greatly. The control 
variables for these models maintain their signs and do not differ greatly in levels of 
significance.  
 
Given a positive sign on the purchase ratio, substantial shareholders buying is a sign that a 
takeover is likely to occur. This result supports Hypothesis 2; the substantial shareholders 
purchase ratio is positively related to the likelihood of a bid. The target prediction rate of 
this model is much higher; by adding the substantial shareholder purchase ratio to the 
previous model, the target prediction rate increases from 49.4 to 58.5%. This shows that not 
only does the odds ratio of the likelihood of takeover increase when substantial 
shareholders increasing their buys relative to sells, but the overall model increases accuracy. 
This supports Brockman and Yan (2009) who find that in the US, the existence of block 
holders increase the probability of informed trading. The ability of substantial shareholder 
trades to signal an incoming takeover indicates the level of information they hold. The 
results from individual groups of substantial shareholders show that financial institution and 
corporation substantial shareholders’ purchase ratios provide stronger explanatory power 
than those of management substantial shareholder purchase ratios. In summary the results 
of these tests provide a strong argument that the purchase ratios of substantial shareholder 
trading calculated during the pre-bid period are significantly and positively correlated to the 
likelihood of a bid and they increase the accuracy of the model. 
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To further examine substantial shareholder informational advantage, we use a Tobit model 
to address whether substantial shareholders’ purchase ratios in the pre-bid period are able 
to predict the bid premium associated with an incoming bid (Hypothesis 3). We also 
examine the effects of different types of substantial shareholder purchase ratios on the bid 
premium. Table 4 displays results of the Tobit analysis conducted on the subsample of 
target firms with bids. In general, the results show that substantial shareholder purchase 
ratios have an insignificant effect on the bid premium. Across panels A, B and C, different 
measures of premium are used; namely the bid premium relative to the previous day’s price 
(PREM1), the previous week’s price (PREM7) and previous month’s price (PREM30). We find 
that almost all measures of substantial shareholders’ purchase ratios are not significantly 
related to the bid premium. Only financial institutions’ purchase ratios are significantly 
related to the premium based on the previous day’s price. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
When testing PREM1 and PREM7, all purchase ratio coefficients have a negative sign, 
indicating a negative relationship between substantial shareholders’ purchase ratios and the 
premium measured. This implies that substantial shareholders increase their sells, relative 
to buys, when the bid will have a higher premium. The signs of the purchase ratio 
coefficients are mixed when testing PREM30, however these coefficients show very little 
significance. The level of significance of the net purchases measure in general decreased as 
the lag between the bid date and the date used to find the base price increased.  
 
Control variables used in the models show some significance, consistent across models 
when examining particular measures of bid premium. In Panel A, the growth resource 
mismatch measure GROWSC is significant and positive, indicating that a higher premium is 
placed on high growth, low resource firms. In both Panels B and C the price-to-book 
measure is significant, but negative indicating that firms with a higher price-to-book ratio 
are receiving a higher premium. EBIT growth and return on equity are significant in the 
PREM7 and PREM30 model sets respectively, and both negatively related, indicating that 
firms with poorer growth prospects and performance receive lower premiums. Of the deal 
characteristic variables included, stock only deals were significant and negatively related to 
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the bid premium, when examined against PREM1, but the level of significance decreased as 
more lagged base prices were used to calculate the premium.  
 
Due to the peculiar results found, we conduct a subsample analysis of high and low 
premium target firms, split into high and low subsamples by the mean. Given the 
significance found in financial institution substantial shareholder purchase ratios, we 
conduct a subsample analysis on both the aggregate and financial institution substantial 
shareholder purchase ratio measures.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Table 5 displays results for the subsample analysis. The purchase ratios of both aggregate 
and financial institution substantial shareholders are not significantly related to the 
premium calculated using all three different measures of premium. When split into high and 
low premium subsamples, we do not find different signs between high and low premium 
sets in aggregate as both are positive. In financial institution substantial shareholders, the 
high premium sets have a negative sign and low premium a positive sign, however these 
coefficients are highly insignificant. 
 
Theoretically a substantial shareholder would attempt to increase their holdings in order to 
obtain greater benefits from the bid premium. However, the results do not support this 
theory. We find that purchase ratios are negatively related to the bid premium, albeit not 
significantly. This suggests a few different possible explanations. Substantial shareholders 
may trade stealthily in order to achieve profits. Bris (2005) examines insider trading around 
acquisitions in 52 countries under various insider trading laws, finding that insider trading 
law enforcement increases the incidence and profitability of insider trading. The results 
presented in Table 4 may allude to this; substantial shareholders may choose to increase 
their holdings if they know that a bid’s premium will not be very substantial in order to 
avoid suspicion. Further evidence for this theory is that financial institution substantial 
shareholders are the only group where there is a significant relationship. Rumours 
surrounding a bid with a larger premium may cause substantial shareholders, particularly 
financial institutions, to trade more cautiously so as to avoid suspicion of insider trading.  
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Another explanation is that substantial shareholders do not have ex ante information about 
the bid premium, only about the existence of an incoming bid. This means that their trades 
are able to signal the incoming bid but they do not increase their buys in order to capture a 
higher premium as they do not know what the premium of the bid will be. Overall we do not 
find evidence to support Hypothesis 3; substantial shareholders’ purchase ratios do not 
have a positive relationship with the bid premium. Nor do we find support for Hypothesis 3a 
as management substantial shareholders’ purchase ratios are not more strongly related to 
the bid premium than other groups.  
 
Subsample analysis between high and low premium deals further supports the latter 
explanation; aggregate substantial shareholders’ purchase ratios do not negatively relate to 
high premiums. Financial institution purchase ratios are negatively related to premium, but 
at a weak significance level. This shows that the more likely explanation for the relationship 
between substantial shareholder purchase ratios and the bid premium is that substantial 
shareholders do not hold information about the bid’s premium.  
 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
 
Substantial shareholders are widely assumed to have informational advantage over other 
shareholders, potentially through a comparative advantage in collecting and processing 
information or privileged management consultation. This premise is implicit in legislation 
that requires holders of five per cent or more of a company’s ordinary voting rights to 
disclose and report changes in their holdings. We examine whether substantial 
shareholders’ assumed informational advantage manifests in the pre-bid trading behaviour 
of target substantial shareholders as they seek to increase their profit from the premium 
typically offered in a takeover bid. We test whether aggregated substantial shareholders in 
251 Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) target firms traded differently to 251 matched control 
firms, controlling for substantial shareholders’ normal trading by comparing their trading 
immediately prior to a bid to a control period before the bid. We find evidence that target 
substantial shareholders make greater net purchases than control firm substantial 
shareholders prior to a bid.  
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We also test whether substantial shareholders’ trades were predictive of the likelihood of a 
bid, and bid characteristics including the premium. We find that substantial shareholder 
trades significantly improve the accuracy of bid prediction models, although there is no 
evidence that substantial shareholders are able to predict the bid premium, or other deal 
characteristics such as the method of payment. These findings are robust to changes in the 
measure of substantial shareholder trading activity. All tests are conducted using an 
aggregate of all types of substantial shareholders, as well as separate types of substantial 
shareholders in order to test whether a particular subset of substantial shareholders has 
more explanatory power than others. Interestingly, we find that insiders (management) 
have the least explanatory power, when compared to financial institutions or other 
corporations’ trades. While substantial shareholders may have an informational advantage, 
they may not all act on this information.  
 
These findings suggest a few things; first, in general substantial shareholders hold an 
informational advantage regarding future takeover activity. Substantial shareholders 
increase their net purchases and trade more aggressively prior to a bid. Second, more 
accurate prediction of the likelihood of a bid may be the extent of substantial shareholders’ 
informational advantage. We infer that substantial shareholders either do not have or do 
not exploit information about the terms or details of the deal as their aggregated trades are 
not significant predictors of the bid premium or other deal characteristics. Finally, the 
findings indicate that management insiders do not have the most informative trades. A 
possible explanation is that insider trading regulation means that managers’ trades are 
subject to heavier market scrutiny and require more stringent disclosure in trading, 
restricting them from acting on private information. Other substantial shareholders are 
under less scrutiny from the market and regulatory bodies and thus more easily able to 
trade on their superior information. Another explanation is that the ability to predict 
takeover bids is a result of a comparative advantage held by substantial shareholders. As 
substantial shareholders by definition are less diversified than minority shareholders, their 
superior returns around a takeover bid may be part of their compensation for accepting the 
diversifiable risk and more closely monitor managers.  
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While the manually collected data set of substantial shareholder trades has benefits in its 
direct usage in this study, there are limitations to the information collected. First, as this 
study only deals with Form 604: Change in Substantial Holdings, we do not record instances 
of Form 603: Becoming a substantial holder and Form 605: Ceasing to be a substantial 
holder. As such a holder of 10% may decrease their holdings by 5.01% to 4.99%, which 
would not be accounted for. While the exact change in holdings would not be discernible 
from the 603 or 605 forms, it is still an information source about substantial shareholder 
trading that has not been exploited. Following from this, only movements of 1% or greater 
are recorded. A substantial shareholder may own 5% of a company and subsequently 
increase their holdings to 5.99% which would not be reported. As such the data is likely to 
have a downward bias which limits its ability to reflect true substantial shareholder trading 
activity.  
 
The second limitation is related to the timing of substantial shareholder trades. As a 
substantial shareholder is only required to report their change in holdings once they reach 
the 1% change threshold, the timing of the change in holdings is unclear. For example a 
substantial shareholder holding 7% ownership may increase their holdings by 0.99% prior to 
the bid without reporting their trade, then increase by a further 0.01% after the bid 
announcement, at which they will report a 1% change occurring on the date after the bid 
announcement. Trading activity such as this would not be represented in this data set as the 
notices recorded were only those that were reported up until the bid announcement date. 
This is particularly important for firms of substantial market capitalisation in which even a 
0.5% increase holdings is a substantial absolute investment. 
 
Studies examining substantial shareholders and their role in the market are sparse, leaving 
much scope for future research to examine different signals of their trading activity, 
whether prior to informational events or through regular trading periods. For example 
future research could study whether substantial shareholders hold a continuous 
informational advantage by examining the relationship between their trades and the time 
series of stock returns. Such research would complement this study in further discerning the 
extent of the supposed informational advantage substantial shareholders hold and the 
signals their trades could provide to the market.  
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Another potential area for future research is to examine the extent to which returns are 
affected by insider trading and substantial shareholder trading; in particular management 
substantial shareholders. Having found that management substantial shareholders’ trades 
provide little explanatory power in the predicting upcoming takeovers, perhaps a more 
granular approach is required, which could incorporate substantial shareholder notices with 
insider trading disclosures. A combined database with this information could provide further 
insight into the trading behaviour of investors who potentially hold superior information, 
and their effect on the market. 
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Table 1: Substantial Shareholder Trade Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the sample of substantial shareholder trades. Panel A displays 
descriptive statistics of all trades from different firms and time periods. Positive values indicate purchases while 
negative values indicate sales. Dollar, in Millions is the dollar value of the overall trade in millions of dollars. 
Volume, in Millions is the number of shares in the overall trade in millions of shares. Panel B displays 
descriptive statistics of both Dollar and Volume in Millions of units, arranged in subsamples depending on 
whether the notice is submitted during the pre-bid or control period and whether the notice is submitted under a 
target firm or control firm. Panel C displays descriptive statistics of the set of 251 target firms. Assets and 
MarketCap are reported in millions of dollars. PB is the price-to-book ratio, VOLA is the firm’s price volatility 
prior to the bid, CVOLA is the firm’s change in price volatility across periods, RET is the firm’s average daily 
price return, ROE is the firm’s return on equity, GROWEBIT is the firm’s EBIT growth over the past year, 
NETINTCOV is the firms net interest cover reported in thousands, and GROWSC is the sales growth to current 
ratio. Detailed descriptions of these characteristics are available in Table 4. 
Panel A: Total Trades N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min.  Max.  Skew. Kurt. 
        Dollar, in Millions 1182 49.213 0.894 1104.553 -266.871 33405.680 27.000 764.551 
Volume, in Millions 1182 6.777 1.627 120.193 -2335.035 2927.883 6.228 420.429 
         
Panel B: By Period, Firm      
         Trades in pre-bid periods, in target firms 
     Dollar, in Millions 584 35.365 1.030 749.320 -206.278 18093.520 24.029 579.563 
Volume, in Millions 584 3.882 2.160 31.601 -274.417 233.000 -1.235 36.744 
         Trades in pre-bid periods, in control firms 
     Dollar, in Millions 217 162.028 0.868 2267.690 -95.043 33405.680 14.619 214.809 
Volume, in Millions 217 -7.334 1.125 167.396 -2335.035 294.000 -12.590 174.511 
         Trades in control periods, in target firms 
     Dollar, in Millions 161 4.544 0.236 21.845 -62.055 172.185 3.647 26.943 
Volume, in Millions 161 2.968 0.630 13.981 -63.060 82.830 2.325 19.580 
         Trades in control periods, in control firms 
     Dollar, in Millions 220 7.610 1.176 38.476 -266.871 230.161 0.957 26.285 
Volume, in Millions 220 31.182 1.594 215.958 -253.906 2927.883 11.371 149.410 
Panel C: Target          
Assets (‘000 000s) 251 881.180 111.010 2299.158 0.004 20858.000 5.188 36.598 
MarketCap (‘000 000s) 251 573.140 67.927 1482.565 0.746 11720.550 4.791 30.020 
PB 251 1.637 1.040 1.868 -0.170 9.680 2.729 11.175 
VOLA 251 0.189 0.044 0.748 0.000 8.040 9.399 97.674 
CVOLA 251 0.017 0.000 0.217 -1.756 1.718 2.227 50.732 
RET 251 0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.012 0.023 1.475 9.149 
ROE 251 0.201 0.019 3.756 -4.933 56.651 13.721 205.257 
GROWEBIT 251 2.023 0.283 14.806 -0.965 230.711 14.803 228.602 
NETINTCOV (‘000s) 251 -801.773 -0.002 8392.937 -60900 94700 0.004 0.081 
GROWSC 251 23.716 0.068 193.242 -27.085 2201.666 10.396 112.687 
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Table 2: Difference-in-Difference Regressions for Trading Activity Prior to Bids using Volume 
This table shows the results from a combination of multivariate regressions conducted to test the differences in 
trading activity in target and control firms in pre-bid and control time periods. The regressions use a set of 251 
target firms and 251 control firms that were listed on the ASX during the period 1/1/2010-31/12/2013. The 
dependent variable used for the particular model is displayed at the top of each set of results; the prefix A 
indicates a measure of all substantial shareholder trading, F indicates an aggregate of financial institution 
substantial shareholders, M indicates an aggregate of management substantial shareholders and C indicates an 
aggregate of corporation substantial shareholders, while the suffix BUY indicates that the variable is an 
aggregate of substantial shareholder buys across the period, SELL indicates that the variable is an aggregate of 
substantial shareholder buys across the period and NET indicates that the variable is an aggregate of substantial 
shareholder buys minus sells across the period, all elements winsorised at the 1% level. TARGET indicates 
when the firm is a target or control firm. PREBID indicates when the observation is during the pre-bid period or 
the control period. TARGET*PREBID is an interaction between both TARGET and PREBID. LNVOLA is the 
log stock price volatility. CVOLA is the change in volatility between periods. RET is the average stock return 
for the prior period. LNPB is the log of the firm’s price-to-book ratio. LNASSETS is the log of the firm’s total 
asset value. SCHEME indicates if the deal is a Scheme of Arrangement. CASH indicates a cash only bid. 
STOCK indicates a stock only deal. DRECOM indicates an accept response by director recommendation. Test 
statistics include relevant p-values (two-tailed) from robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance 
levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  ABUY   ASELL   ANET 
Variable 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
Panel A: Aggregate          
TARGET 
 
-5.178 0.1209 
 
-0.632 0.7158 
 
-4.397 0.1337 
PREBID 
 
-1.912 0.5161 
 
-0.444 0.7542 
 
-2.648 0.3025 
TARGET*PREBID 
 
15.430*** 0.0001 
 
5.612*** 0.0038 
 
11.210*** 0.0011 
LNVOLA 
 
0.068 0.5296 
 
0.059 0.2776 
 
0.034 0.7124 
CVOLA 
 
1.143 0.7882 
 
-0.545 0.6487 
 
1.103 0.7653 
RET 
 
-42.420 0.8574 
 
14.040 0.8882 
 
-164.000 0.3501 
LNPB 
 
-0.581 0.1523 
 
-0.523*** 0.0091 
 
-0.170 0.6411 
LNASSETS 
 
2.216*** 0.0001 
 
1.331*** 0.0000 
 
1.076** 0.0253 
SCHEME 
 
-1.087 0.7395 
 
-2.052 0.1190 
 
0.764 0.7989 
CASH 
 
-2.083 0.5365 
 
-2.044 0.3146 
 
-0.596 0.8432 
STOCK 
 
-0.776 0.8599 
 
-1.385 0.5147 
 
-0.251 0.9490 
DRECOM 
 
0.522 0.8373 
 
1.065 0.5961 
 
-0.692 0.7791 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Year Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Constant 
 
-27.320*** 0.0044 
 
-18.790*** 0.0000 
 
-11.730 0.1421 
Adj. R-squared 
 
0.030 
  
0.038 
  
0.002 
 N. of cases 
 
956 
  
956 
  
956 
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   FBUY  FSELL  FNET 
Variable  Coef. p. value  Coef. p. value  Coef. p. value 
Panel B: Fin. Institution       
TARGET 
 
-4.033* 0.0981 
 
-0.775 0.4671 
 
-3.408 0.1327 
PREBID 
 
-1.963 0.3247 
 
-0.100 0.9047 
 
-2.414 0.2076 
TARGET*PREBID 
 
10.570*** 0.0001 
 
3.351*** 0.0057 
 
7.498*** 0.0024 
LNVOLA 
 
0.033 0.7014 
 
0.034 0.2916 
 
0.022 0.7832 
CVOLA 
 
0.844 0.8337 
 
-0.416 0.6546 
 
1.193 0.7282 
RET 
 
-12.450 0.9378 
 
0.766 0.9888 
 
-77.490 0.5526 
LNPB 
 
-0.835*** 0.0046 
 
-0.314** 0.0120 
 
-0.480* 0.0755 
LNASSETS 
 
2.114*** 0.0000 
 
1.051*** 0.0000 
 
1.183*** 0.0015 
SCHEME 
 
-1.807 0.3672 
 
-0.669 0.5317 
 
-0.324 0.8601 
CASH 
 
-0.109 0.9652 
 
-0.204 0.8727 
 
-0.437 0.8419 
STOCK 
 
-0.059 0.9813 
 
0.124 0.9213 
 
-0.907 0.6928 
DRECOM 
 
0.078 0.9648 
 
-0.461 0.6284 
 
0.354 0.8100 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 
Constant 
 
-29.970*** 0.0000 
 
-15.820*** 0.0000 
 
-16.170*** 0.0069 
Adj. R-squared 
 
0.048 
  
0.050 
  
0.009 
 N. of cases 
 
956 
  
956 
  
956 
        
  MBUY  MSELL  MNET 
  Coef. p. value  Coef. p. value  Coef. p. value 
Panel C: Management          
TARGET 
 
-0.053* 0.0749 
 
0.013 0.1153 
 
-0.063** 0.0403 
PREBID 
 
0.062 0.1283 
 
0.000 1.0000 
 
0.056 0.1578 
TARGET*PREBID 
 
0.003 0.9602 
 
0.010 0.1277 
 
-0.002 0.9756 
LNVOLA 
 
0.001 0.4186 
 
-0.001 0.4138 
 
0.001 0.4491 
CVOLA 
 
0.030 0.2312 
 
0.002 0.5833 
 
0.028 0.2836 
RET 
 
1.450 0.6060 
 
-0.363 0.1267 
 
2.243 0.4262 
LNPB 
 
-0.003 0.6154 
 
0.001 0.2922 
 
-0.002 0.7289 
LNASSETS 
 
-0.018** 0.0446 
 
-0.000 0.6298 
 
-0.016* 0.0791 
SCHEME 
 
0.007 0.8813 
 
-0.007** 0.0116 
 
0.015 0.7482 
CASH 
 
0.048 0.2145 
 
-0.017** 0.0449 
 
0.067* 0.0880 
STOCK 
 
0.070 0.2813 
 
-0.020** 0.0199 
 
0.087 0.1830 
DRECOM 
 
0.035 0.5408 
 
0.001 0.9365 
 
0.035 0.5443 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 
Constant 
 
0.326* 0.0556 
 
0.006 0.6545 
 
0.283* 0.0920 
Adj. R-squared 
 
0.006 
  
0.024 
  
0.005 
 N. of cases 
 
956 
  
956 
  
956 
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CBUY   CSELL   CNET 
  Coef. p. value  Coef. p. value  Coef. p. value 
Panel D: Corporation          
TARGET 
 
0.632 0.4717 
 
0.052 0.7147 
 
0.731 0.4062 
PREBID 
 
-0.270 0.5562 
 
-0.079 0.3500 
 
-0.278 0.5292 
TARGET*PREBID 
 
2.845*** 0.0010 
 
0.233* 0.0883 
 
2.668*** 0.0017 
LNVOLA 
 
0.005 0.8550 
 
0.005 0.2208 
 
0.001 0.9639 
CVOLA 
 
-0.500 0.2677 
 
-0.068 0.3714 
 
-0.461 0.2924 
RET 
 
-60.450* 0.0662 
 
-6.491 0.2533 
 
-57.230* 0.0791 
LNPB 
 
0.021 0.8517 
 
-0.032* 0.0588 
 
0.041 0.7200 
LNASSETS 
 
0.017 0.8633 
 
-0.001 0.9150 
 
0.015 0.8780 
SCHEME 
 
-1.118 0.1461 
 
-0.173* 0.0548 
 
-1.007 0.1882 
CASH 
 
-0.837 0.3355 
 
-0.097 0.4733 
 
-0.938 0.2787 
STOCK 
 
-0.472 0.6831 
 
-0.128 0.4134 
 
-0.470 0.6841 
DRECOM 
 
-0.080 0.9161 
 
0.036 0.7588 
 
-0.068 0.9287 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Year Fixed Effects 
 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Constant 
 
0.524 0.7384 
 
0.211 0.2577 
 
0.490 0.7520 
Adj. R-squared 
 
0.028 
  
0.007 
  
0.027 
 N. of cases   956 
  
956 
  
956   
30 
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression using Purchase Ratio 
This table presents the results of the logit regressions conducted to test the effect of substantial shareholder purchase ratios on the likelihood of a bid. The regressions use a 
set of 251 target firms and 251 control firms that were listed on the ASX during the period 1/1/2010-31/12/2013. The dependent variable is BID, indicating whether the firm 
is a target firm and has a bid, or a control firm without a bid. PURCHASERATIO is the purchase ratio of the particular category of substantial shareholders, as indicated for 
the model, winsorised at the 1% level. ROE is the return on equity for the firm. GROWEBIT is the firm’s one year EBIT growth. LNPB is the log of the firm’s price-to-book 
ratio. GROWSC is the ratio of the firm’s one year operating revenue growth to the current ratio. NETINTCOV is the firm’s net interest cover. LNASSETS is the log of the 
firm’s total assets. Test statistics include relevant p-values (two-tailed) from robust standard errors, the Log Likelihood, McFadden R-Squared, the model’s Correct Prediction 
Rate and Chance Prediction rate. *, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
No Trades 
 
Aggregate 
 
Fin. Institution 
 
Management 
 
Corporation 
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
PURCHASERATIO 
   
0.670*** 0.227 
 
0.604** 0.245 
 
0.269 0.625 
 
1.220*** 0.359 
    
(0.0031) 
  
(0.0138) 
  
(0.6669) 
  
(0.0007) 
 ROE 0.018** 0.007 
 
0.019* 0.011 
 
0.019** 0.009 
 
0.018** 0.007 
 
0.023 0.026 
 
(0.0131) 
  
(0.0813) 
  
(0.0297) 
  
(0.0126) 
  
(0.3813) 
 GROWEBIT 0.015 0.012 
 
0.015 0.010 
 
0.017 0.014 
 
0.014 0.011 
 
0.012 0.007 
 
(0.2061) 
  
(0.1387) 
  
(0.2222) 
  
(0.1819) 
  
(0.1042) 
 LNPB 0.057 0.063 
 
0.056 0.063 
 
0.055 0.064 
 
0.058 0.063 
 
0.057 0.063 
 
(0.3678) 
  
(0.3781) 
  
(0.3849) 
  
(0.3559) 
  
(0.3676) 
 GROWSC -0.002* 0.001 
 
-0.001* 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 
 
-0.002* 0.001 
 
-0.002** 0.001 
 
(0.0904) 
  
(0.0751) 
  
(0.1027) 
  
(0.0908) 
  
(0.0344) 
 NETINTCOV -1.12E-08 8.03E-09 
 
-9.14E-09 7.10E-09 
 
-9.23E-09 6.94E-09 
 
-1.10E-08 7.93E-09 
 
-1.20E-08 9.82E-09 
 
(0.1642) 
  
(0.1979) 
  
(0.1834) 
  
(0.1647) 
  
(0.2213) 
 LNASSETS 0.039 4.92E-02 
 
0.027 0.0495 
 
0.020 0.050 
 
0.042 0.050 
 
0.038 0.050 
 
(0.4260) 
  
(0.5893) 
  
(0.6937) 
  
(0.3967) 
  
(0.4430) 
 Industry Fixed Effects YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Year Fixed Effects YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Constant -0.673 0.867 
 
-0.695 0.873 
 
-0.470 0.874 
 
-0.727 0.875 
 
-0.803 0.879 
 
(0.4376) 
  
(0.4260) 
  
(0.5904) 
  
(0.4059) 
  
(0.3613) 
 Log Likelihood -336.40 
  
-331.70 
  
-333.21 
  
-336.34 
  
-329.83 
 McFadden R-squared 0.014 
  
0.027 
  
0.023 
  
0.014 
  
0.033 
 Target Prediction Rate 49.390     58.537     56.504     51.016     54.878   
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Table 3: Tobit Regression using Purchase Ratio 
This table presents the results of the tobit regressions conducted to test the effect of substantial shareholder purchase ratios on the bid premium. The regressions use a set of 
251 target firms and 251 control firms that were listed on the ASX during the period 1/1/2010-31/12/2013. The dependent variable is the bid premium, the specific premium 
measure indicated in the panel name. PREM1 indicates the premium is calculated as the bid price divided by the price 1 day prior, PREM7 indicates the premium is 
calculated as the bid price divided by the price 7 days prior and PREM30 indicates the premium is calculated as the bid price divided by the price 30 days prior. 
PURCHASERATIO is the purchase ratio of the particular category of substantial shareholders, as indicated for the model winsorised at the 1% level. ROE is the return on 
equity for the firm. GROWEBIT is the firm’s one year EBIT growth. LNPB is the log of the firm’s price-to-book ratio. GROWSC is the ratio of the firm’s one year operating 
revenue growth to the current ratio. NETINTCOV is the firm’s net interest cover. LNASSETS is the log of the firm’s total asse ts. Test statistics include relevant p-values 
(two-tailed) from robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
  Aggregate   Fin. Institution   Management   Corporation 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
Panel A: PREM1 
           PURCHASERATIO -0.090 0.1110 
 
-0.120** 0.0418 
 
-0.031 0.8198 
 
-0.081 0.2221 
ROE -0.037 0.5272 
 
-0.037 0.5128 
 
-0.029 0.6482 
 
-0.034 0.5588 
GROWEBIT -0.007 0.3367 
 
-0.010 0.2507 
 
-0.007 0.4054 
 
-0.006 0.1665 
LNPB -0.003 0.8154 
 
-0.002 0.8798 
 
-0.001 0.9052 
 
-0.002 0.8828 
GROWSC 0.001** 0.0359 
 
0.001** 0.0467 
 
0.001** 0.0299 
 
0.001** 0.0221 
NETINTCOV 2.28E-09 0.4781 
 
2.55E-09 0.4736 
 
3.28E-09 0.2661 
 
3.05E-09 0.2864 
LNASSETS -0.015 0.2640 
 
-0.012 0.3832 
 
-0.018 0.2189 
 
-0.017 0.2213 
SCHEME 0.067 0.1869 
 
0.068 0.1809 
 
0.058 0.2600 
 
0.060 0.2489 
CASH -0.058 0.4884 
 
-0.074 0.3835 
 
-0.062 0.4580 
 
-0.058 0.4744 
STOCK -0.213** 0.0143 
 
-0.221** 0.0126 
 
-0.212** 0.0153 
 
-0.212** 0.0128 
DRECOM 0.057 0.2822 
 
0.059 0.2570 
 
0.057 0.2732 
 
0.056 0.2859 
Industry Fixed Effects YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Year Fixed Effects YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Constant 0.290*** 0.0000 
 
0.289*** 0.0000 
 
0.292*** 0.0000 
 
0.291*** 0.0000 
N. of cases 184 
  
184 
  
184 
  
184 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.254     0.271     0.232     0.244   
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  Aggregate   Fin. Institution   Management   Corporation 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
Panel B: PREM7 
           PURCHASERATIO -0.045 0.4749 
 
-0.039 0.5913 
 
-0.029 0.8150 
 
-0.041 0.5937 
ROE -0.064 0.2090 
 
-0.062 0.2237 
 
-0.056 0.2933 
 
-0.061 0.2366 
GROWEBIT -0.017* 0.0880 
 
-0.018* 0.0707 
 
-0.016* 0.0971 
 
-0.016 0.1210 
LNPB 0.026*** 0.0055 
 
0.026*** 0.0048 
 
0.026*** 0.0073 
 
0.026*** 0.0050 
GROWSC 0.001 0.1907 
 
0.001 0.1945 
 
0.001 0.1712 
 
0.001 0.1542 
NETINTCOV 1.09E-09 0.7976 
 
1.35E-09 0.7563 
 
1.57E-09 0.7042 
 
1.54E-09 0.7024 
LNASSETS -0.009 0.5338 
 
-0.008 0.5905 
 
-0.010 0.4977 
 
-0.009 0.5027 
SCHEME 0.098 0.1106 
 
0.096 0.1150 
 
0.093 0.1353 
 
0.094 0.1317 
CASH 0.081 0.3445 
 
0.076 0.3824 
 
0.080 0.3522 
 
0.080 0.3472 
STOCK -0.110 0.2228 
 
-0.111 0.2229 
 
-0.105 0.2425 
 
-0.106 0.2359 
DRECOM 0.060 0.3165 
 
0.061 0.3108 
 
0.061 0.3057 
 
0.060 0.3163 
Industry Fixed Effects YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Year Fixed Effects YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Constant 0.357*** 0.0000 
 
0.357*** 0.0000 
 
0.357*** 0.0000 
 
0.357*** 0.0000 
N. of cases 192 
  
192 
  
192 
  
192 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.136     0.136     0.134     0.135   
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Aggregate   Fin. Institution   Management   Corporation 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
Panel C: PREM30 
           PURCHASERATIO 0.002 0.9767 
 
-0.034 0.6077 
 
0.027 0.8078 
 
-0.007 0.9408 
ROE -0.123** 0.0474 
 
-0.126** 0.0400 
 
-0.124** 0.0487 
 
-0.124** 0.0480 
GROWEBIT -0.010 0.2844 
 
-0.010 0.2542 
 
-0.011 0.2951 
 
-0.010 0.3448 
LNPB 0.038*** 0.0000 
 
0.037*** 0.0000 
 
0.038*** 0.0001 
 
0.038*** 0.0000 
GROWSC 0.001 0.3521 
 
0.001 0.3858 
 
0.001 0.3409 
 
0.001 0.3509 
NETINTCOV 3.88E-09 0.2970 
 
3.64E-09 0.3445 
 
3.87E-09 0.2943 
 
3.84E-09 0.2986 
LNASSETS -0.001 0.9669 
 
0.001 0.9582 
 
-9.60E-05 0.9953 
 
-0.001 0.9671 
SCHEME 0.104 0.1075 
 
0.106 0.1022 
 
0.104 0.1072 
 
0.104 0.1079 
CASH 0.036 0.6737 
 
0.033 0.6954 
 
0.036 0.6721 
 
0.037 0.6682 
STOCK -0.121 0.1792 
 
-0.124 0.1672 
 
-0.121 0.1791 
 
-0.121 0.1797 
DRECOM 0.096 0.1416 
 
0.096 0.1441 
 
0.096 0.1429 
 
0.096 0.1420 
Industry Fixed Effects YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Year Fixed Effects YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
 Constant 0.350*** 0.0000 
 
0.350*** 0.0000 
 
0.350*** 0.0000 
 
0.350*** 0.0000 
N. of cases 187 
  
187 
  
187 
  
187 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.189     0.190     0.189     0.189   
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Table 4: Robustness - Tobit Regression Subsample Analysis using Purchase Ratio by High and Low Premium Bids 
This table presents the results of the Tobit regressions conducted to test the effect of substantial shareholder purchase ratio on the bid premium. The regressions use a set of 
251 target firms and 251 control firms that were listed on the ASX during the period 1/1/2010-31/12/2013. The dependent variable is the bid premium, the specific premium 
measure indicated in the panel name. The sample is split into high and low premium bids by the mean premium. PREM1 indicates the premium is calculated as the bid price 
divided by the price 1 day prior, PREM7 indicates the premium is calculated as the bid price divided by the price 7 days prior and PREM30 indicates the premium is 
calculated as the bid price divided by the price 30 days prior. PURCHASERATIO is the purchase ratio of the particular category of substantial shareholders, as indicated for 
the model winsorised at the 1% level. ROE is the return on equity for the firm. GROWEBIT is the firm’s one year EBIT growth. LNPB is the log of the firm’s price-to-book 
ratio. GROWSC is the ratio of the firm’s one year operating revenue growth to the current ratio. NETINTCOV is the firm’s net interest cover. LNASSETS is the log of the 
firm’s total assets. Test statistics include relevant p-values (two-tailed) from robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Aggregate   Financial Institutions 
 
High Premium 
 
Low Premium 
 
High Premium 
 
Low Premium 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
Panel A: PREM1            
PURCHASERATIO 0.035 0.3112 
 
0.005 0.9427 
 
-0.004 0.8933 
 
-0.056 0.4553 
ROE 0.011 0.7829 
 
-0.084* 0.0616 
 
0.003 0.9345 
 
-0.085* 0.0646 
GROWEBIT -0.001** 0.0396 
 
-0.019 0.2788 
 
-0.001** 0.0189 
 
-0.019 0.2255 
LNPB 0.003 0.3646 
 
-0.005 0.7291 
 
0.002 0.4735 
 
-0.006 0.7202 
GROWSC 0.001** 0.0360 
 
0.000 0.6878 
 
0.001* 0.0746 
 
0.000 0.7063 
NETINTCOV 9.42E-10 0.3807 
 
4.37E-09 0.2614 
 
7.22E-10 0.5240 
 
2.27E-09 0.6114 
LNASSETS 0.004 0.5835 
 
-0.042** 0.0134 
 
0.005 0.5301 
 
-0.039** 0.0255 
SCHEME -0.028 0.3594 
 
0.035 0.5286 
 
-0.019 0.5223 
 
0.036 0.5158 
CASH 0.072* 0.0745 
 
-0.079 0.3738 
 
0.071* 0.0900 
 
-0.086 0.2931 
STOCK 0.016 0.7087 
 
-0.158* 0.0641 
 
0.015 0.7368 
 
-0.164* 0.0532 
DRECOM 0.010 0.7161 
 
0.003 0.9433 
 
0.012 0.6616 
 
0.005 0.9177 
Industry Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES   YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES   YES  
Constant 0.114*** 0.0000 
 
0.202*** 0.0000 
 
0.114*** 0.0000 
 
0.201*** 0.0000 
N. of cases 97 
  
87 
  
97 
  
87 
 Pseudo R-squared -0.328     -6.306     -0.315     -6.482   
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  Aggregate   Financial Institutions 
 
High Premium 
 
Low Premium 
 
High Premium 
 
Low Premium 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
Panel B: PREM7            
PURCHASERATIO 0.034 0.4177 
 
0.016 0.8484 
 
-0.019 0.6445 
 
0.007 0.9427 
ROE -0.059 0.2342 
 
-0.083 0.1877 
 
-0.068 0.1429 
 
-0.084 0.1947 
GROWEBIT -0.002 0.1481 
 
-0.045*** 0.0069 
 
-0.002** 0.0256 
 
-0.045*** 0.0070 
LNPB 0.040*** 0.0000 
 
0.012 0.4406 
 
0.039*** 0.0000 
 
0.012 0.4356 
GROWSC 0.000 0.8084 
 
0.001 0.3767 
 
0.000 0.6254 
 
0.001 0.3777 
NETINTCOV 2.52E-09* 0.0728 
 
-1.20E-08 0.3122 
 
2.33E-09 0.1365 
 
-1.21E-08 0.3070 
LNASSETS 0.018 0.1584 
 
-0.055** 0.0194 
 
0.019 0.1356 
 
-0.055** 0.0224 
SCHEME -0.014 0.7040 
 
0.125 0.1499 
 
-0.002 0.9602 
 
0.124 0.1473 
CASH 0.162*** 0.0027 
 
0.164 0.1048 
 
0.161*** 0.0037 
 
0.166 0.1057 
STOCK 0.056 0.2226 
 
-0.003 0.9762 
 
0.054 0.2483 
 
-0.004 0.9664 
DRECOM 0.032 0.3008 
 
-0.063 0.4204 
 
0.034 0.2769 
 
-0.064 0.4165 
Industry Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES   YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES   YES  
Constant 0.141*** 0.0000 
 
0.311*** 0.0000 
 
0.141*** 0.0000 
 
0.311*** 0.0000 
N. of cases 97 
  
95 
  
97 
  
95 
 Pseudo R-squared -2.234     0.330     -2.215     0.330   
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  Aggregate   Financial Institution 
 
High Premium 
 
Low Premium 
 
High Premium 
 
Low Premium 
Panel C: PREM30 Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
 
Coef. p. value 
PURCHASERATIO 0.081 0.1728 
 
0.047 0.6158 
 
-0.011 0.8479 
 
0.020 0.8167 
ROE -0.125* 0.0693 
 
-0.041 0.4136 
 
-0.143** 0.0402 
 
-0.040 0.4365 
GROWEBIT -0.004 0.2946 
 
-0.027 0.1066 
 
-0.004** 0.0494 
 
-0.028* 0.0867 
LNPB 0.050*** 0.0000 
 
0.033* 0.0544 
 
0.048*** 0.0000 
 
0.033* 0.0529 
GROWSC -0.004** 0.0105 
 
0.001** 0.0442 
 
-0.004*** 0.0058 
 
0.001** 0.0469 
NETINTCOV 2.33E-09 0.2653 
 
-4.37E-09 0.5023 
 
1.81E-09 0.4311 
 
-4.68E-09 0.4891 
LNASSETS 0.017 0.2668 
 
-0.041** 0.0319 
 
0.019 0.2179 
 
-0.041** 0.0349 
SCHEME 0.018 0.7224 
 
0.091 0.3248 
 
0.041 0.4220 
 
0.088 0.3373 
CASH 0.170** 0.0159 
 
-0.002 0.9819 
 
0.162** 0.0284 
 
0.005 0.9632 
STOCK 0.089 0.1903 
 
-0.124 0.3008 
 
0.082 0.2567 
 
-0.126 0.2946 
DRECOM 0.033 0.4414 
 
-0.003 0.9687 
 
0.038 0.3853 
 
-0.008 0.9154 
Industry Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES   YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES   YES  
Constant 0.199*** 0.0000 
 
0.315*** 0.0000 
 
0.201*** 0.0000 
 
0.315*** 0.0000 
N. of cases 95 
  
92 
  
95 
  
92 
 Pseudo R-squared 1.438     0.376     1.390     0.373   
 
 
